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Non-technical summary 
 
The last couple of years have seen an increasing interest in the evaluation of competition 
policy both in practice and in academia. With respect to the former, the Office of Fair 
Trading in the UK, for instance, recently started to estimate the ‘positive impact’ of its 
activities on direct benefits to consumers. In academia, recent research shows an increasing 
interest in special topics such as the effectiveness of merger control, the effects of competi-
tion policy interventions or the robustness of certain methods to evaluate competition pol-
icy.     
 Against this background, this paper assesses the impact of the detection of a hard-core 
cartel in the Swiss market for road surfacing on post-cartel competition. In addition to an 
investigation of supply-side factors, demand-side factors, and market prices, the paper also 
derives estimates of the economic effects of the decision. The results indicate that the de-
tection of the cartel may have led to short-term price reductions; however, the persistent 
collusion-friendly industry structure forecloses larger and durable gains for the customers. 
 With respect to the implications of the case study for general cartel policy, one im-
provement possibility would be to carry out screenings to identify potentially collusion-
friendly industries by using a set of collusion factors. Subsequently, these suspicious indus-
tries should then be investigated more closely focusing on market structure, market behav-
ior and market results, possibly in the form of ‘inquiries’ conducted by the UK Competi-
tion Commission. Such an approach would not only raise the probability to detect cartels 
directly but it would also create a signal for the firms in the respective industries that they 
are on a watch. Ideally, one of the companies becomes nervous enough to decide to apply 
for leniency.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Das Wichtigste in Kürze 
 
In den vergangenen Jahren hat die Bedeutung einer Evaluation von Wettbewerbspolitik 
deutlich zugenommen – dies gilt sowohl für das praktische als auch das wissenschaftliche 
Umfeld. Aus praktischer Sicht hat beispielsweise das Office of Fair Trading im Vereinig-
ten Königreich vor Kurzem damit begonnen, die positiven Wirkungen seiner Aktivitäten 
auf die Konsumentenwohlfahrt zu messen. Aus wissenschaftlicher Sicht zeigen jüngere 
Forschungsprojekte ein gesteigertes Interesse für die Betrachtung von Spezialthemen wie 
der Effektivität der Fusionskontrolle, den Effekten wettbewerbspolitischer Eingriffe oder 
der Robustheit bestimmter Methoden der Evaluation von Wettbewerbspolitik.  
 Vor diesem Hintergrund untersucht der vorliegende Beitrag die Auswirkungen der Auf-
deckung einer Kartellabsprache im Schweizer Markt für Strassenbeläge auf den Wettbe-
werb. In Ergänzung zu einer Analyse der Angebots- und Nachfrageseite sowie der Markt-
preisentwicklungen unternimmt der Beitrag auch eine grobe Abschätzung der möglichen 
ökonomischen Effekte der Entscheidung der Schweizer Wettbewerbskommission. Die Er-
gebnisse zeigen, dass die Entscheidung kurzfristig durchaus zu Preissenkungen beigetragen 
haben mag, dass aber die persistente kollusionsfreundliche Industriestruktur die Realisie-
rung grösserer und dauerhafterer Vorteile für die Konsumenten vermutlich verhindert hat.     
 Im Hinblick auf die allgemeinen Implikationen der Fallstudie für die Kartellverfolgung 
lässt sich der Vorschlag ableiten, auf Seiten der Wettbewerbsbehörde sogenannte Scree-
nings mit Hilfe eines Baukastens von Kollusionsfaktoren durchzuführen um auf diese Wei-
se potentiell kollusionsgefärdete Industrien zu identifizieren. Diese Industrien sollten dann 
in der Folge genauer untersucht werden im Hinblick auf Anzeichen für bestehende Ab-
sprachen – womöglich in Form von sogenannten ‚inquiries‘ wie sie von der UK Competi-
tion Commission bereits seit geraumer Zeit durchgeführt werden. Die Verfolgung eines 
solchen Ansatzes würde nicht nur die durchschnittliche Aufdeckungswahrscheinlichkeit 
für Kartellabsprachen erhöhen, sondern es würden automatisch Signale an die betreffenden 
Industrien gesendet, dass sie unter Beobachtung stehen. Im Idealfall würde dies dazu füh-
ren, dass einige oder mehrere Unternehmen ‚nervös genug‘ würden um sich für die An-
wendung der Kronzeugenregelung zu bewerben und somit zur Aufdeckung des betreffen-
den Kartells aktiv beitragen.    
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I. INTRODUCTION 
There is no significant doubt among economists that competition policy has established 
itself in most industrialized countries as an integral part of public policy that contributes 
substantially to the improvement of the wealth of nations. However, the follow-up question 
of how substantial these benefits of competition policy have been has not yet attracted 
huge research input by economists. This ‘state of the art’ is unfortunate as, for instance, 
competition authorities have to justify their budgets (or requests for budget increases) and 
might find it helpful to show the significance of their work. Furthermore, economists also 
benefit from showing to what extent society benefits from their public policy recommenda-
tions.  
 Against this background, the paper aims at assessing the question whether competition 
policy matters by analyzing the impact of the detection of a hard-core cartel in the Swiss 
market for road surfacing on post-cartel competition. In addition to an investigation of 
supply-side factors, demand-side factors, and market prices, the paper also derives esti-
mates of the economic effects of the decision. 
 In order to reach the aim of the paper it is structured into six sections. Following this 
brief introduction, the second section reviews the theoretical and empirical foundations of 
antitrust actions against hard-core cartels. Additionally, existing evaluation studies are re-
viewed which try to assess the effectiveness and the impact of cartel enforcement policies. 
The third section describes the Swiss road surfacing cartel case with regard to the decision 
as well as the economically meaningful relationships of the enquiry of the Swiss Competi-
tion Commission (COMCO). Furthermore, other comparable cases in Europe are briefly 
sketched. The fourth section analyzes the road surfacing market before and after the deci-
sion. The analysis differentiates between a supply-side analysis, a demand-side analysis, 
and a market price analysis. Subsequently, the fifth section provides (hypothetical) esti-
mates of the economic effects of the decision. The sixth section concludes the paper and 
provides avenues for further research.  
II. THE ANTITRUST ECONOMICS OF HARD-CORE CARTELS 
In general, an integrated approach of competition policy against potentially anticompetitive 
forms of business conduct has to comply with the following steps: A characterization and 
rationalization of the respective business conduct, an assessment of the welfare effects and 
the development and implementation of detection and intervention strategies.1 The forth-
coming sections follow this basic structure with respect to the business conduct hard-core 
cartel. The discussion is amended by an overview of the general possibilities to assess the 
effectiveness and the impact of cartel enforcement.  
A. Characterization and rationalization of hard-core cartels   
A hard-core cartel is typically defined as “… a group of firms who have agreed explicitly 
among themselves to coordinate their activities in order to raise market price – that is, they 
have entered into some form of price fixing agreement.”2 The types of agreement that typi-
cally lead to such an increase in market price include not only price fixing agreements in 
the literal sense but also bid-rigging (collusive tenders), output restrictions and quotas, al-
location of customers, suppliers, territories, and lines of commerce.3  
 From a business perspective, firms have an incentive to coordinate their activities, e.g. 
in the form of hard-core cartels, because this leads to greater profits than acting independ-
ently. The basic rationale for this allegation lies in the internalization of a positive external-
ity when firms consider restricting their supply in order to raise prices. In a competitive 
                                                 
1 See Hüschelrath (2009). 
2 Pepall et al. (1999, p. 345). 
3 See Crampton (2003, p. 5). 
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market, a firm is simply interested in how much a reduction in its own output benefits it-
self, while it ignores the (positive) effect that a reduction in output has on the profits of the 
other firms in the market (via the reduction in total market output and the corresponding 
increase in price). A cartel internalizes this effect by taking into account how changes in 
the output level of each firm affect joint cartel profits.4 As a consequence, it pays for the 
cartel to reduce total output below the competitive level and thereby increases joint profits.  
 Although economic research has identified numerous cases in which cartels have aimed 
at raising joint profits by exploiting customers, empirical studies do not generally support 
this presumption. In particular, a seminal empirical paper by Asch and Seneca5 investigates 
whether the profit rates of colluding firms differ from those of non-colluding firms and 
whether the incidence of collusion can itself be explained on the basis of the structure and 
performance patterns of affected firms and markets. The results of Asch and Seneca show 
that colluding firms are consistently less profitable than non-colluding firms in the same 
relevant market, and that important structural differences exist between the two groups. 
Somehow puzzled by especially the first result, Asch and Seneca nevertheless doubt that 
collusion really consistently leads to lower profitability and explain their results by the 
possibility that antitrust prosecution centers largely on the unsuccessful manifestations and 
leaves the truly successful cartels undetected.6  
 Another explanation discussed by Asch and Seneca7 and Rotemberg and Saloner8 is the 
possibility that unsatisfactory performance may motivate firms to collude (under condi-
tions which are not favorable to create stable cartel agreements). Historically, such an ar-
gument has been based on the hypothesis that cartels might be ‘knights in shining armor’, 
meaning that cartels are formed in difficult economic times characterized by unsatisfactory 
performance as well as high risk and uncertainty, which is mirrored in cut-throat competi-
tion and price warfare. Following Lipczynski and Wilson9, “[c]ollusion is seen as a way of 
easing the pressures of competition by unified action rather than just a strategy to maxi-
mize joint profits … evidence shows that firms enter cartel-type agreements to protect 
themselves rather than because of a desire to exploit the market. Agreements tend … to 
keep out or keep under control potential entrants and new products that could threaten the 
stability of existing firms.” From a historical perspective, Neumann10 argues that funda-
mental changes in production technology in the second half of the nineteenth century led – 
partly via the corresponding changes in the cost structures of firms – to large collaborations 
which, because of the typically high share of fixed costs, were especially vulnerable in 
economic downturns. Following Bittlingmayer11, especially the combination of high fixed 
costs facing volatile demand indeed may have caused periods in which the market price 
dropped below average costs. From that perspective, cartels at that time could be seen as 
an instrument to fight these price drops and therefore might have been in the public inter-
est.12  
 Although some of these arguments have had played important roles in the toleration of 
cartels in several European countries in the nineteenth and the early twentieth centuries13, 
contemporary economic research tends not to support the view that cartels nowadays are 
merely firm reactions to ‘tough times’. Apart from general objections against such argu-
ments – which could, for instance, remind of the fact that the pressures of competition play 
                                                 
4 See Carlton and Perloff (2000, 122ff.) for a detailed treatment. 
5 Asch & Seneca (1975). 
6 See also Shughart & Tollison (1998, 367ff.). 
7 Asch & Seneca (1975). 
8 Rotemberg & Saloner (1986). 
9 Lipczynski & Wilson (2001, 50ff.). 
10 Neumann (2000, 28 ff.). 
11 Bittlingmayer (1992). 
12 See Neumann (2000, 28ff.) and Richardson (1965) for more detailed assessments. 
13 See Resch (2005) for an historical overview. 
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an indispensable role in every market economy (and are typically in the interest of society) 
– a theoretical assessment by Haltiwanger and Harrington14 and empirical studies by 
Dick15 and Bagwell and Staiger16 imply that cartels are in danger of breaking apart in re-
cessions.17 Such findings are somewhat contradictory to the knight-in-shining-armor moti-
vation to form cartels mentioned above.  
 In addition to the ‘profit-maximization’ and ‘tough times’ arguments, which have been 
the focus of academic research on the motivation to form cartels, an alternative way to as-
sess this question is to look at the justifications brought forward by detected cartels them-
selves. Although it is fairly obvious that these arguments do not necessarily have to reflect 
the true motivations for cartel formation – but might in fact have been developed ex post as 
part of a defense strategy in court – they nevertheless have to make use of logically sound 
lines of economic reasoning. In a detailed assessment of these justifications for cartels, the 
World Bank18 identifies four frequently applied arguments: the industry cannot function 
with competition; the industry competes on service and quality; safety and quality will 
decline without the cartel; and the cartel is necessary to stop unfair and unethical competi-
tion. These arguments all have in common that they are built on the belief that competition 
is not working in the industry (from the perspective of the cartel firms), and therefore that a 
concerted action by the industry – which might lead to elevated prices, but which also pro-
duces benefits for the consumers (by maintaining a high level of service and quality as well 
as safety) – is justified. Without wanting to enter into a detailed economic assessment of 
these ‘excuses’ for cartel formation19, one simple but disarming counterargument would be 
that it is not the industry that has to decide whether competition is unworkable. Economic 
research and practical experiences in the majority of cases show that competition is typi-
cally socially desirable and it is up to the respective state bodies to decide whether some 
form of regulatory intervention is necessary, for example, to secure a high level of safety 
or to water down the consequences of unethical competition. 
B. Welfare effects of hard-core cartels and competition policy implications   
Given the assessment of the business motivations for hard-core cartels in the last section, 
an assessment of the welfare effects seems to be straightforward. A perfectly functioning 
hard-core cartel (involving all firms in the market) leads to the same market outcome as a 
monopoly and therefore causes similar types and degrees of allocative, productive and dy-
namic inefficiencies. Additionally, hard-core cartels usually do not create any kind of ben-
efits to society which could be traded-off against the anticompetitive effects from an anti-
trust perspective. As a consequence, contemporary hard-core cartels are a prime candidate 
for a per se prohibition irrespective of the particular characteristics of the industry, product 
or type of agreement.  
 Despite this clear statement with respect to the welfare effects of hard-core cartels, sim-
ple game-theoretic reasoning suggests that antitrust bans (and antitrust enforcement) 
against such cartels may be unnecessary, because firms will typically fail to stabilize cartel 
agreements and, hence, the negative welfare consequences predicted above would not ma-
terialize. In a simple one-shot duopoly game, for example, it is straightforward to show 
that competition and not cartelization is the dominant strategy for both firms. Although 
both firms realize that they would achieve a higher profit in the cartelization state, they 
also realize that the rival firm has a substantial profit incentive to cheat on such a collusive 
agreement. As both firms anticipate this possibility (as well as the negative consequences 
                                                 
14 Haltiwanger & Harrington (1991). 
15 Dick (1996). 
16 Bagwell & Staiger (1997). 
17 See Neumann (2000, 31f.). 
18 World Bank (1999, 24ff.). 
19 See World Bank (1999, 24f.). 
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for their own profit), it is the dominant strategy for both firms not to collude. The subse-
quent policy conclusion would be that, although cartel agreements in theory harm social 
welfare, it is not necessary to consider antitrust bans or even antitrust actions against them, 
as firms typically fail to stabilize such agreements anyway.  
 The diagnosed chronic instability of cartels in one-shot games is basically caused by a 
lack of trust between the two companies. Although it is admittedly hard to establish trust in 
one-shot games, it is also hard to believe that one-shot games are a suitable description of 
real markets. Typically, firms meet regularly in a market (or even in a couple of markets) 
and this repeated interaction creates possibilities to stabilize cartel agreements. Although it 
cannot be the aim of this section to give a comprehensive overview of possible strategies to 
stabilize cartels20, it is straightforward to see that repeated interaction gives cartel members 
the opportunity to implement effective punishment strategies for cheaters which also re-
duce the incentives to deviate and therefore stabilize the cartel.21 
 Although firms have developed various incentive schemes to stabilize cartel agree-
ments, these schemes typically cannot be applied profitably in every market environment. 
The underlying economic reasons are twofold. On the one hand, the profit differential be-
tween the cartel profit and the competitive profit – i.e., “the difference between the most 
profitable outcome possible for the firms (the best possible Nash equilibrium) and the 
worst”22 – depends on the specifics of the market and market interaction. On the other 
hand, the costs of operating a cartel – i.e., reaching and monitoring cartel agreements, and 
possible antitrust fines and damages – also depend on the specifics of the market and mar-
ket interaction and might become prohibitive in certain constellations. To give a simple 
example, consider a market with 10 firms and a market with 3 firms. Ceteris paribus, it can 
be expected that it is more costly to reach and maintain a cartel agreement in a market with 
10 firms than in a market with only 3 firms, simply because negotiations (and the subse-
quent monitoring) among 10 parties is typically more complex and expensive than negotia-
tions among only 3 parties. 
 In addition to this simple structural example focusing on the number of firms in a mar-
ket, theoretical research has identified an ample number of additional factors which have 
the potential to influence the potential benefits and costs – and therefore the rationality and 
stability – of cartels and collusion. Rey23 – in accordance with many other commentators 
on the topic – subdivides these factors into structural, supply-related and demand-related 
factors. Structural factors that ease collusion include a low number of competitors (as dis-
cussed above), high entry barriers, frequent interaction between firms, and market trans-
parency. Demand-related factors include market growth, absence of significant fluctuations 
or business cycles, low demand elasticity, buying power, and the absence of club and net-
work effects. Finally, supply-related factors which ease collusive agreements include ma-
ture industries (with stable technologies), symmetric costs, symmetric capacities, product 
homogeneity, multi-market contact, structural links and collaborations, and other contrac-
tual agreements. The theoretical reasoning upon which these different collusion factors are 
based can be found, for instance, in Rey24, Motta25, Ivaldi et al.26 and Grout and Sondereg-
ger.27   
                                                 
20 See, e.g., Schulz (2003) and Feuerstein (2005) for surveys.  
21 Imagine a simple duopoly game that is played infinitely. It is then possible to show that the incentive to 
cheat depends on the discount factor δ. In other words, as long as the discount factor is sufficiently high (i.e., 
the firms are sufficiently patient and value future profits to a sufficient extent), deviation does not pay for 
either of the firms and the agreement is therefore stable. 
22 Whinston (2006, p. 40). 
23 Rey (2006). 
24 Rey (2006). 
25 Motta (2004). 
26 Ivaldi et al. (2003). 
27 Grout & Sonderegger (2005). 
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 In addition to theoretical research, empirical studies have shown that firms can not only 
be successful in maintaining their agreements over long time periods but often also manage 
to overcome cartel crises, such as market entry of new firms or the emergence of dispute 
among existing cartel members.28 Although cartels typically fail to reach the outcomes of a 
hypothetical single monopolist – given the existence of cartel outsiders or remaining forms 
of non-price competition (which keep up some competition) – they often manage to raise 
prices significantly above competitive levels. Audretsch29, for instance, found significantly 
elevated market prices for a sample of cartels in Western Germany. Connor and Lande30 
collected average overcharges of six economic surveys consisting of more than 100 cartels. 
They find that the average cartel overcharges differ considerably among the different em-
pirical studies. Levenstein and Suslow31, for instance, calculate an average overcharge 
(mean) of 43%, while Werden32 finds 21% and the OECD33 15, 75% for the average over-
charge (mean). The average of all studies shows a mean of 30, 7%. Typically, the dead-
weight losses caused by cartels add between 10% and 30% of the overcharges in order to 
receive the total customer losses due to cartelization.  
 Following the theoretical and empirical evidence it can be concluded that hard-core car-
tels are a prime candidate for a per se prohibition.34 Such a conclusion does not necessarily 
preclude the possibility that there might occasionally be hard-core cartels which would 
have raised overall welfare; however, such occurrences are considered so rare that a per se 
ban remains the appropriate antitrust reaction.35 Assuming that such a per se ban of hard-
core cartels is codified, the questions occur how an competition authority (together with 
the complementary court system) can reduce the formation of cartels and how it can detect 
and punish existing cartels. With respect to the first question, the competition authority can 
apply certain ex ante instruments (such as blacklists, regulation of communication or coor-
dinated effects analysis in merger control) which aim at preventing the formation of cartels 
in the first place. With respect to the second question, the competition authority can revert 
to several ex post instruments (such as leniency programs or active market monitoring) 
which focus on detecting cartels in the literal sense.36 The subsequent interventions against 
detected hard-core cartels are motivated by the belief that the imposition of fines discour-
ages attempts by firms to form hard-core cartels. Consequently, the fundamental purpose 
of antitrust fines is to create and keep up an (ex ante) deterrence effect by signaling to the 
companies that substantial fines will have to be paid if their conspiracy is detected. 
C. Assessing the effectiveness and the impact of cartel enforcement   
In general, an assessment of the effectiveness and the impact of cartel enforcement face an 
identification problem. If only a few cartels are detected, this could on the one hand be an 
indicator of a successful deterrence policy of the competition authority. On the other hand, 
however, an alternative interpretation of such an observation could be that the competition 
authority follows an ill-equipped approach to detect cartels or suffers from insufficient 
resources to exercise its duties conscientiously. Vice versa, an increase in the detection of 
cartels could on the one hand be an indicator that certain policy changes were steps in the 
right direction. However, on the other hand, it could also indicate that only the number of 
                                                 
28 See Levenstein & Suslow (2004) for a comprehensive overview. 
29 Audretsch (1989). 
30 Connor & Lande (2006). 
31 Levenstein & Suslow (2004). 
32 Werden (2003). 
33 OECD (2003). 
34 It should be noted at this point that only price agreements involving substitutes are considered here as hard-
core cartels. The welfare implications of price agreements affecting subsequent production stages (i.e. com-
plementary products) are far less clear from an academic as well as practical perspective.   
35 See also Whinston (2006, 15ff.). 
36 See Motta (2004, 190ff.). 
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cartels has risen and the competetion authority was able to detect some of them more or 
less accidentally. As a consequence, the number of detected or prosecuted cartels is typi-
cally an inappropriate indicator for the effectiveness of a cartel enforcement strategy of a 
competition authority. 
 Despite the crucial identification problems, economists nevertheless have identified 
several possibilities to assess the effectiveness and the impact of cartel enforcement. Gen-
erally, the existing studies can be subdivided into two parts: macro studies which assess the 
effectiveness of a cartel enforcement strategy of a competition authority and micro studies 
which investigate the precise impact of particular cartel enforcement actions. For conduct-
ing macro studies, it is first necessary to derive a best practice framework. If serious devia-
tions from this best practice framework are found it can be assumed that the competition 
policy actions with respect to cartels are suboptimal. A straightforward example of such a 
study would be an assessment of the leniency program of a competition authority. Another 
focus which recently attracted significant attention is the question whether the fines actu-
ally collected by the competition authorities come anywhere near to the theoretically de-
rived optimal fines (and therefore signal firms that cartelization does not pay). Velja-
novski37, for instance, collected data on duration, fines imposed, sales, overcharges and 
consumer losses for several detected and prosecuted hard-core cartels in the European Un-
ion. He further calculated the theoretically optimal fines – largely based on the respective 
cartel overcharge estimate (the measure for ‘harm caused’) as well as a presumed probabil-
ity of detection for cartels of 33%. He finds that the fines collected by the European Com-
mission largely under-deter price-fixing. The optimal fine would have been between 1.6 
and 115.5 times higher than the fines actually imposed. However, although these results on 
the surface speak for significant under-deterrence, it has to be kept in mind that the public 
fines considered by Veljanovski might be complemented by other costs, which can be in-
terpreted as additional fines from the viewpoint of the cartel members. In addition to nega-
tive stock price reactions and private damage claims, whose importance recently began to 
grow in the European Union, an additional cost is created by the lawsuit itself (and the 
respective fees for lawyers and economists)38. Furthermore, as found by Karpoff et al.39, 
the reputation effect typically causes the major loss subsequent to discovery of suspicious 
behavior. These losses are found to be particularly high if the violation was to the detri-
ment of customers.  
 The micro studies investigate the precise impact of particular cartel enforcement ac-
tions. For example, one possibility is to focus on an analysis of customer losses due to ac-
tual cartelization and to argue that without successful cartel enforcement the respective 
cartels would have continued to exist, causing welfare losses. In other words, the direct 
benefits of detecting a cartel can be approximated by the net present value of the yearly 
benefits for society in the future40. However, it is obvious that such an analysis can only 
measure a fraction of the real welfare contribution of cartel enforcement as the benefits 
achieved through deterrence are excluded from the analysis.    
 Still aiming at assessing the impact of hard-core cartel enforcement on a micro level, 
another quantitative possibility is to analyze its effect on post-cartel prices. From a theo-
retical perspective, the breakdown of a cartel should be followed by price declines down to 
the non-collusive level. Empirical evidence, however, partly suggests that this price decline 
is often less significant. Feinberg41, for example, found a decline in average prices in four 
out of five investigated cartels between 6.6% and 11.4% which, however, partly disap-
                                                 
37 Veljanovski (2007). 
38 See, e.g., OECD (2007, p. 30).  
39 Karpoff et al. (2008). 
40 See Hüschelrath (2009) for a case study. 
41 Feinberg (1984). 
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peared in the five years following the cartel detection. Sproul42 surveys 25 price-fixing 
cases between 1973 and 1984 with respect to the price levels four years after the break-
down. He finds an increase in prices of 7% on average for his sample. Thompson and Ka-
serman43 analyze the stock price movements ‘after the fall’ of 57 price-fixing cases with 
127 firms involved. They find that within roughly one year of indictment, the stock prices 
of 85% of the firms in the sample had returned to their pre-indictment (collusive) values. 
Confronted with these results, they conclude that cartel enforcement has a very little lasting 
effect on market outcomes. “While it punishes individual offenders, it does not effectively 
deter collusion on any sort of sustained basis” 44, basically because the cartel-adequate 
market structures remain unchanged after the conviction (and so the general incentives to 
re-build the cartel at a later point). In line with this finding, Harrington45 concludes from 
his review of the empirical research that cartel enforcement typically leads to price de-
clines in the short run, however, that price increases are often experienced in the medium 
and long run. One explanation for this observation could be that firms learned to collude 
tacitly and therefore managed to realize prices above the competitive level. In addition to 
the fact that the detection of a cartel does not change the collusion-friendly market struc-
ture of the industry (and therefore keep up the basic collusion incentives), the cartel mem-
bers might have an additional incentive to avoid fierce price competition in the post-cartel 
period, as this would signal the court a higher harm caused by the cartel (probably causing 
the fixation of a lower ‘but-for’ price in the trials). 
 Despite this somewhat mixed empirical evidence on the impact of cartel enforcement, it 
is important to recall the significance of the deterrence effect of sanctioning cartels. Block 
et al.46, for example, test their theoretical model described above and indeed find for the 
US bread industry that an increase in the DOJ’s enforcement capacity or filing of a DOJ 
price-fixing complaint had a negative effect on the price markups. Furthermore, Block and 
Feinstein47 find evidence on the existence of a deterrence effect in highway construction 
procurement auctions. Clarke and Evenett48 show for the case of the international vitamins 
cartel that the cartel reduced its overcharges in jurisdictions with tough cartel enforcement. 
For most European jurisdictions, this reduction in overcharges reached by the presence of 
tough cartel enforcement regimes was already large enough to cover a substantial propor-
tion of the overall budgets of the respective competition authorities (including the budget 
of DG Competition at the European Commission). Finally, Symeonidis49 analyzes the ef-
fect of the introduction of anti-cartel laws in the United Kingdom in 1956 and finds that 
price competition increased and led to lower margins in industries which had been previ-
ously cartelized.  
 Based on these existing studies on the effectiveness and the impact of cartel enforce-
ment it is the aim of the remainder of the paper to analyze the impact of the detection of a 
hard-core cartel in the Swiss market for road surfacing on post-cartel competition. In addi-
tion to an investigation of supply-side factors, demand-side factors and market prices, the 
paper also derives estimates of the economic effects of the decision. 
 
III. THE SWISS ROAD SURFACING CARTEL CASE AT A GLANCE 
Following Article 5 of the Swiss Cartel Act (KG) ‚[a]greements that significantly affect 
competition in the market for certain goods or services and are not justified on grounds of 
                                                 
42 Sproul (1993). 
43 Thompson & Kaserman (2001). 
44 Thompson & Kaserman (2001, p. 334) 
45 Harrington (2005, p. 5). 
46 Block et al. (1981) 
47 Block & Feinstein (1986). 
48 Clarke & Evenett (2003, 725f.). 
49 Symeonidis (2000). 
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economic efficiency and all agreements that lead to the suppression of effective competi-
tion are unlawful.’ Under the old Swiss cartel law (effective before April 2004) only com-
panies which repeatedly offended this cartel ban were subject to pecuniary fines. With the 
commencement of the amendment of the Swiss Cartel Act on 1 April 2004, the Competi-
tion Commission (COMCO) gained considerably new powers, especially with respect to 
the possibilities to sanction anticompetitive behavior by imposing substantial fines already 
for first offenders.    
 In the following sections the Swiss road surfacing cartel case is sketched with respect to 
the decision as well as the economically meaningful relationships of the inquiry of the 
Competition Commission. The entire inquiry and the decision is published in German lan-
guage in the 4/2004 edition of Recht und Politik des Wettbewerbs50 which is the official 
journal of the Swiss Competition Authorities.  
A. The case over time  
On 3 November 1998, legal representatives of two road construction companies in North-
eastern Switzerland – Kiesel Girsberger and Buettner – filed charges at the COMCO for an 
alleged cartel agreement in the market for road surfacing in Northeastern Switzerland (in-
cluding the neighboring foreign countries Germany and Austria). 
 In the aftermath, the office of the COMCO carried out preliminary investigations be-
tween 21 December 1998 and 20 July 1999 which resulted in several indications that a 
number of vertically-integrated road surfacing companies in the region agreed upon prices, 
quantities and locations in the market for asphalt mix which is an essential input good for 
road surfacing. It was assumed that a so-called exclusive dealing agreement (EDA) was 
introduced aiming at separating the high-price country Switzerland from its lower-price 
neighboring countries. As a consequence, competition in the downstream markets of road 
surfacing and road construction in Northeastern Switzerland was distorted. 
 Given the indications of an existing cartel agreement, the office of the COMCO started 
an enquiry of the market for road surfacing on 20 July 1999. The initial focus of the en-
quiry was a couple of holding companies active in Northeastern Switzerland – namely 
BHT, BHZ, Biturit, FBB and Siderit. However, in the course of the enquiry, evidence was 
found that other companies with a direct or indirect share in the holding companies Siderit, 
BHZ, BHT and Biturit, could also have participated in the cartel. As a consequence, the 
enquiry was extended to include all road construction companies listed in Figure 1 below. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
50 The journal can be accessed at http://www.weko.admin.ch/dokumentation/00157/index.html?lang=de . 
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Figure 1. The industry structure at the time of the investigation. 
As shown in Figure 1, the industry structure at the time of the investigation is characterized 
by a number of road construction companies that hold shares in a couple of holding com-
panies. These holding companies are the legal owners of the mixing plants for asphalt mix 
in Northeastern Switzerland.   
 On 4 December 2000 the Competition Commission decided on the case. The exclusive 
dealing agreement (EDA) was classified as an illegal type of collusion and its termination 
was commanded.  
B. The enquiry 
The exclusive dealing agreement (EDA) primarily affects the cantons of Schaffhausen, 
Thurgau and Zurich in Northeastern Switzerland. However, given their proximity to the 
Swiss border, the neighboring German companies, AMB and Storz, were also included in 
the EDA. This is especially relevant because the prices for asphalt mix in Germany were 
significantly lower than in Switzerland, leaving the German companies with a possibly 
significant cost advantage.  
1. Exclusive dealing agreement (EDA) 
On 24 June 1996 Siderit and AMB reached a written agreement that AMB would guaran-
tee Siderit exclusive distribution rights for Hot Mix Asphalt for the cantons of Aargau, 
Zurich, Schaffhausen and Thurgau. In turn, Siderit agreed to sell a minimum of 20,000-
30,000 tons per year of AMB’s production in Switzerland. Moreover, Siderit obligated 
itself to stop the delivery of asphalt mix to Germany. The key aim of the agreement was to 
raise the market prices in Switzerland in such a way that Siderit could successfully survive 
in the Swiss market. The coordination of the contract was taken over by BHZ.  
 On 29 May 1997, Badertscher AG signed a contract with Siderit, BHZ, BHT and Biturit 
with the following content: Siderit and Badertscher AG fix the prices for the quantities of 
asphalt mix imported from Germany into the cantons of Thurgau and Zurich. Badertscher 
AG would, on behalf of BHT, carry out the allocation of the German asphalt mix in the 
canton of Thurgau. The transportation costs for the delivery of the German asphalt mix 
would be borne by Siderit. Furthermore, Badertscher AG agreed not to procure or process 
asphalt mixes from competing plants either within Switzerland or from abroad. 
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2. The relevant market for an assessment of the EDA 
With respect to the delineation of the product market, the typical customers of road con-
struction companies are the respective state departments responsible for road construction. 
The choice of the mixing plant which delivers the asphalt mix, however, falls under the 
authority of the construction company who is consigned with the respective construction 
project. Typically, the construction of asphalt roads takes place by applying three layers of 
asphalt – the wearing layer, the base layer, and the foundation layer. The asphalt mix 
needed for these layers has slightly different configurations, however, mixing plants are 
usually suited to produce asphalt mixes for all three layers so that the layer material for a 
construction site is usually delivered from a single mixing plant. As a consequence, the 
relevant market is found to be the whole market for ‘road surfacing’, in which mixing 
plants compete against each other. 
 With respect to the geographical dimension of market delineation, the intensity of com-
petition for a certain road surfacing project is dependent on the geographical location of the 
construction site. In particular, two factors play an important role: First, the transport cost 
restrictions and second, the quality state of the asphalt mix when reaching the construction 
site. Both factors are determined by the transport duration. With respect to the first, trans-
portation costs typically increase with the transported distance. As a consequence, even if a 
certain mixing plant has a cost advantage in the production of asphalt mix, this advantage 
diminishes with increased distance to the construction site. With respect to the second fac-
tor, asphalt mix quality, transport duration is also a crucial determinant for the intensity of 
competition as the asphalt mix cannot be processed at the construction site if its tempera-
ture falls below a certain threshold value. As a consequence, the market for asphalt mixes 
is in fact a collection of regional markets which continuously change due to variations of 
the construction sites. As a point of reference, the office of the COMCO estimated that 
mixing plants can procure asphalt mix in an acceptable quality within a driving distance of 
approx. 60 min. This corresponds to a geographical radius of about 50-80 km. 
 Given the geographical market delineation and especially the estimated maximum driv-
ing distance of 60 min as the radius around the respective mixing plants of AMB and 
Storz, the regions directly affected by the EDA can be identified. This impact area is 
named W1 in Figure 2 below.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2. Impact areas of the German mixing plants (W1) and the agreement (W2). 
W1 
W2 
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A dot in Figure 2 represents a German mixing plant which can theoretically deliver asphalt 
mix into Switzerland and therefore possibly imposes some kind of competitive constraint 
(which was tackled by the EDA). Again assuming the 60 min radius, Figure 2 also allows 
delineating an impact area of the agreement within Switzerland. This area is named W2 in 
Figure 2 and involves the possible distribution areas of all companies which were involved 
in the EDA. As a consequence, the COMCO delineated the relevant market for the assess-
ment of the EDA as impact area W2.  
 
3. The impact of the EDA on competition 
Given the delineation of impact areas determined by the locations of the mixing plants it is 
straightforward to deduce a clear picture of how road surfacing companies or mixing plant 
owners, respectively, compete against each other. Given the location of a certain construc-
tion site, road construction companies generally have the choice between all mixing plants 
whose production site is with the 60 min radius.51 Under the assumption that no geographi-
cal price differentiation is possible, economic theory would expect that the competitive 
pressures of the intersecting areas (i.e. construction sites which are located in the distribu-
tion areas of at least two (independent) mixing plants) are carried forward to those areas in 
which delivery is only possible from one mixing plant. As a consequence, ideally, the pro-
ducers of asphalt mix in W1 are in direct competition with the German plants of AMB and 
Storz. Absent of possibilities to price discriminate, this competitive pressure is carried for-
ward to W2. The aim of the EDA was to reduce or even eliminate this effective competi-
tion. 
 Focusing in a more detailed way on an assessment of the competitive pressure within 
Switzerland, the office of the COMCO found that the prices for asphalt mix of AMB and 
Storz before the EDA agreement were roughly 50% lower than the average price charged 
by Swiss producers. As explained above, this imposed significant competitive pressure on 
Swiss companies located in the centre of W1. The independent road construction compa-
nies profited from this as they received their asphalt mix at least partly from German mix-
ing plants. Following the introduction of the EDA, these independent companies weren’t 
able to receive asphalt mix from German plants any more. Additionally faced with a pric-
ing policy by the vertically-integrated Swiss construction companies that strongly favored 
the shareholders52, the independent firms weren’t able to compete against the vertically 
integrated companies any more. Since the share of costs for mixing materials is estimated 
as 15-60% of total costs for road construction, the EDA had significant impact on competi-
tion between the German and Swiss plants. Following the introduction of the EDA on 1 
July 1996 and its extension on 4 August 1997, the direct procurement of asphalt mix from 
the German plants of AMB and Storz was not possible anymore. As a consequence, the 
prices charged by the German mixing plants increased from 1996 to 1998 by about 40%. In 
the same period the prices of the participating Swiss companies increased by less than 5% 
                                                 
51 As already identified above, transport costs play a crucial role in assessing the competitive pressures within 
the industry. If the ex-factory prices of two mixing plants are equal, the construction company will source 
from the mixing plant which is closest to the construction site as this would minimize the sum of production 
and transportation costs. As a consequence, the plant with a geographical proximity advantage has some 
price setting flexibility. Generally, the competitive pressures created by other mixing plants diminish with 
increasing transport distances.  
52 The suppliers of asphalt mix price discriminate with respect to customer segments. The following segments 
existed: Shareholders, independent road construction companies, bulk and small buyers. The investigation of 
the COMCO found that, first, the price differences of BHT, BHZ and FBB did not vary over the years or for 
the different types of asphalt mix. Second, the average price differences between the customer segments are 
relatively high for all companies. These price differences weaken the competitive position of the independent 
road construction companies such as Kiesel Girsberger and Buettner who have to pay significantly higher 
prices for their asphalt mix than the companies belonging to the EDA.  
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(already taking account of an average inflation rate of 3%). This observation clearly indi-
cates that the competitive pressure which originally came from the German plants was re-
duced or even eliminated by the EDA allowing the participating Swiss plants to maintain 
an excessive price level and inefficient production structures. This assumption was under-
pinned by the fact that nearly all vertically-integrated companies in the cantons of Zurich, 
Thurgau and Schaffhausen participated in the EDA leaving no room for competition to 
survive. As a consequence, it can be assumed that there was no effective outside competi-
tion from independent companies which could weaken or even eliminate the harmful com-
petitive effects of the EDA. Additionally, the analysis of the office shows that the probabil-
ity of market entry (as another factor which might constrain the harmful competitive ef-
fects of the EDA) is low. The same low probability applies for a possible disciplining ef-
fect of the opposing market side, the construction companies.  
 
4. Conclusion  
Based on the analysis just sketched, the office of the COMCO concluded that the EDA 
significantly reduced or even eliminated effective competition in the market for road sur-
facing in Northeastern Switzerland. The EDA was therefore classified as a form of illegal 
collusion following Article 5 (Paragraph 1) KG. By terminating the EDA, it can be ex-
pected that asphalt mix could be delivered at considerably lower prices from German 
plants creating competitive pressures on the Swiss mixing plants and thereby restoring ef-
fective competition in the market.  
C. Related cases in Europe 
In addition to the road surfacing cartel case just described, Switzerland and other European 
countries have seen a couple of similar cartel cases. In the following, several recent exam-
ples are sketched. The observation that collusive agreements are by no means an exception 
in this market is a clear sign that it is both possible and profitable to enter into some form 
of cartel agreement. Industrial economists have identified an ample number of factors (re-
lating to market structure and market behavior) which might facilitate collusion (see sec-
tion II.B. above for a brief overview). At least some of these criteria, such as product ho-
mogeneity, high market entry barriers, existing ownership links or multi-market contact are 
present in the market for road surfacing. 
 
1. Road surfacing cartel in the Swiss canton of Ticino (2007) 
In April 2005 the COMCO opened an enquiry in the market for road surfacing in the Swiss 
canton of Ticino. The enquiry was launched following a complaint from Ticino’s Diparti-
mento del Territorio which presented evidence that firms were coordinating tenders for 
road maintenance work by geographical area and on a rotational basis. In its decision of 19 
November 2007 the COMCO concluded that the firm’s agreement fulfils all criteria of a 
hard-core cartel and thus is a serious infringement of the Swiss Cartel Act. The agreement 
caused considerable damage to private clients, public authorities and the taxpayer. The 
enquiry found that the agreement between 17 of the 18 road construction companies active 
in Ticino was effective from January 1999 to (at least) the end of 2004. The key aim was to 
guarantee the respective cartel members certain market shares which were agreed in ad-
vance by controlling the allocation of public and private contracts. The firms met weekly 
to award contracts and decide on compensations. As the cartel agreement was ended before 
the deadline which ends the transition period from the old to the new cartel law (31 March 
2005), the firms cannot be punished (as they were all first offenders). If such a cartel would 
be detected under the revised cartel law, the amount of fines for the companies would have 
been around CHF 30 million.  
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2. Asphalt mixing plant in Austria (2006) 
On 15 March 1999 four construction companies in Austria founded a joint venture to build 
a new asphalt mixing plant, each of them holding a share of 25%. Simultaneously, they 
planned to close down two older mixing plants. After the compulsory notification, the Aus-
trian Competition Authority banned the joint venture as it would likely monopolize the 
market for asphalt mix in the respective region of Austria. The agreement would constitute 
an effective cartel particularly because the members agreed not to build additional asphalt 
mixing plants in proximity to the joint venture plant.   
 The detailed enquiry of the Competition Authority started in 2004. The court carried out 
extensive preliminary investigations with a couple of key conclusions. The companies in-
volved in the joint venture were among the four largest road construction firms in Austria 
at the time with a combined market share of around 80% of the country’s road construction 
market. In the area served by the joint plant the owners also completely or partially owned 
a number of other mixing plants. The jointly-operated plant provided around 10% of as-
phalt mixture needed in the regional market. The companies themselves held a share of 
75% of the regional market for asphalt mixture and 70% of the Austrian market. Top man-
agers of the four companies met on several occasions and discussed the purchase prices 
paid by the parent companies for intermediate products needed at the plant. Despite excess 
capacity and measures to rationalize production, the price of asphalt mix increased con-
tinuously until 2002. All of the road construction firms involved continued to sell asphalt 
mix to their customers at almost exactly the same price until 2004. 
 The Austrian Court of First Instance looked at the case and decided that the firms’ ac-
tivities constituted a cartel agreement rather than a merger or joint venture, especially be-
cause the firms involved in the joint venture had entered a commitment to avoid the con-
struction of any additional mixture plant in the region. The court ordered the immediate 
termination of the cartel. The decision on a possible fine was suspended. 
 
3. Bitumen cartel in the Netherlands (2006) 
Between 1994 and at least 2002 delegations from eight suppliers of road bitumen (BP, 
Esha, Klöckner Bitumen, Kuwait Petroleum, Nynäs, Shell, Total and Wintershall) and six 
construction companies (Ballast Nedam, Dura Vermeer, Heijmans, Hollandsche Beton 
Groep, Koninklijke BAM Groep and Koninklijke Volker Wessels Stevin) met on several 
occasions in the Netherlands in so-called ‘bitumen consultations’. The consultations were 
generally preceded by separate preparatory meetings between the suppliers and the coun-
try’s six largest road construction firms. During the meetings, the gross price of all road 
bitumen sold to asphalt manufacturers in the Netherlands was fixed. In addition, uniform 
minimum rebates were agreed for construction companies that belonged to the cartel, along 
with lower maximum rebates that could be granted to constructors outside of the cartel. 
The construction companies involved in the cartel were apparently less concerned about 
the actual price of bitumen than about securing larger discounts than their smaller competi-
tors. As a result, the price of bitumen in the Netherlands gradually rose above that in 
neighboring countries, even taking the discounts offered to the larger road constructors into 
account. As such, all of the companies involved, be they suppliers or purchasers, profited 
from the cartel. The European Commission worked on the assumption that a price cartel 
was in existence, in clear contravention of Article 81 of the EC Treaty. The firms involved 
were fined a total of EUR 266,717 million.  
 
4. Asphalt Cartel in Finland (2007) 
On 19 December 2007 Finnish Competition Court imposed fines totaling EUR 19.4 mil-
lion on firms that had been part of the Finnish Asphalt Cartel. The Court’s decision con-
firmed the Finnish Competition Authority’s conclusions that the firms in question, which 
controlled a combined market share of over 70% of the Finnish market, were found guilty 
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of fixing prices and coordinated bidding. This was found to have affected central govern-
ment construction projects between 1996 and 2000, as well as local government and pri-
vate projects from 1994 to 2001.  
 
5. Asphalt Cartel in Sweden (2007) 
On 10 June 2007 the Stockholm District Court imposed fines of EUR 53 million on nine 
companies that had participated in the Swedish Asphalt Cartel. In doing so, the court con-
firmed the analysis and conclusions of the Swedish competition authority. The court con-
sidered the proof to be sufficient that the firms involved had allocated market shares 
among themselves over a number of years by reaching agreements on bidding. In addition, 
evidence was found that larger road construction firms had paid smaller companies not to 
submit tenders. The asphalt cartel is the largest cartel ever that has been uncovered and 
punished in Sweden. 
IV. THE ROAD SURFACING MARKET BEFORE AND AFTER THE DECISION 
The key aim of the case study lies in the identification of the economic effects of the detec-
tion of the cartel by the Swiss Competition Commission. In order to reach this aim, the 
Swiss market for road surfacing needs to be analyzed from the supply side (Section IV.A.), 
the demand side (Section IV.B.) and with respect to the development of the market prices 
(Section IV.C.). The availability of longer time series partly allows a comparison of indica-
tors before, during and after the cartel agreement.  
A. Supply-side analysis 
The analysis of the supply-side of the market for road surfacing in Switzerland is two-
staged. First, the Swiss market is compared to other European road surfacing markets. 
Such an analysis may help to identify untypical developments in Switzerland. Second, the 
international trade flows of Hot Mix asphalt involving Switzerland and Germany need to 
be investigated. Such an analysis may help to identify changes due to the termination of the 
cartel agreement.     
1. The Swiss road surfacing market – An international comparison 
With the aim of characterizing the key developments on the supply-side of the market for 
road surfacing in Switzerland, several main market structure parameters needs to be inves-
tigated such as market size (production output), the number and structure of production 
plants or the degree of the vertical integration. In order to interpret the structural character-
istics over time, it seems straightforward not only to present the respective time series for 
Switzerland, but to compare this data with the data for other European countries.  
 For an initial description of the supply side of the market for road surfacing, an analysis 
of the time series of the production of ‚Hot Mix Asphalt’ is helpful to get an idea whether 
the market is growing, stagnating or shrinking. Figure 3 shows the production of Hot Mix 
Asphalt from 1996 to 2005 in smaller European countries. 
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Figure 3. Production of Hot Mix Asphalt from 1996 to 2005 in smaller European coun-
tries. 
As it can be seen in Figure 3, a comparison of the production development in Switzerland 
to other small European countries shows similar and relatively constant production outputs, 
although partly on quite different absolute levels. Changes due to the disclosure of the car-
tel are not observable in Switzerland. Only a considerable increase of the production in 
Austria at the beginning of the new millennium can be stated. This increase could be ex-
plained with the commissioning of a large new production plant. Already a small mobile 
mixing plant can achieve an output of approx. 200t/h leading to an annual output of ap-
prox. 0.4 million tons (assuming 250 working days à 8 h).  
 A further important parameter in the characterization of the supply-side market structure 
is the number of the production plants. From a technical perspective, fixed and mobile 
plants can be differentiated. Fixed plants typically have a considerably larger capacity than 
mobile plants. Generally, the more production plants are available in a specific region, the 
more likely is competition with other plants and the lower is the expected market price. 
Figure 4 displays the development of the number of production plants in Switzerland. 
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Figure 4. Number of production sites in Switzerland (2000-2005). 
As Figure 4 shows, the number of production plants (fixed and mobile) in Switzerland has 
increased from 128 in 2000 to 137 in 2005. This increase of about 7% is considerably 
higher than the European average of about 2%. This seems surprising as – for the same 
time period – the data shows a negative growth of Hot Mix Asphalt production in Switzer-
land. Subject to the location and the ownership structure of the production plants, this de-
velopment could stimulate competition in the market. However, the question whether total 
production capacity has increased due to the increase in production sites cannot be an-
swered with the available data. It cannot be excluded that, for example, large inflexible 
plants have been closed down and replaced by small and more flexible ones. Should the 
observed growth have taken place without the closing of old plants, an increase in excess 
capacity in the Swiss domestic market and a respective pressure on market prices can be 
expected. In the medium and long term, such a market situation would possibly trigger 
either market exits or cartel formation (in order to reduce the prevailing rationalization 
pressure). Additionally, Figure 4 shows that mobile plants do not play a major role in 
Switzerland. Usually they are more frequently used in geographically very spacious coun-
tries such as Norway, Sweden and Finland. 
 Besides the number and growth of the production plants in Switzerland and other Euro-
pean countries, the data also allows comparing the number of production sites per company 
across various European countries (see Figure 5). An analysis of this data might give addi-
tional information on the prevalent industry structure.  
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Figure 5. Average number of production sites per company (2001-2005). 
As shown in Figure 5, the average number of production sites per company in Switzerland 
is slightly above 1 and therefore rather low in a European comparison. Again, it would be 
thinkable to conclude from this finding that competition should at least be possible in 
Switzerland given the fact that most companies only have one production site. However, it 
needs to be taken into account that the above figure may feign a decentralized industry 
structure in Switzerland, as the existing industry structure with several key holding compa-
nies (see Figure 1 above) might not be reflected in the data. Figure 5 further shows that in 
Norway and Sweden, large ‘asphalt corporations’ seem to dominate large parts of the 
country. This might have facilitated the cartel formation in these countries which was iden-
tified in Section III.C. above. 
 Still aiming at assessing the potential for competition in the Swiss road surfacing mar-
ket, the following Figure 6 compares the number of production sites to the length of the 
road network for various European countries. Ideally it could be assumed that the number 
of production sites increases with the length of the road network. Furthermore it could be 
argued that countries with a relatively high number of production sites have a higher com-
petition potential than comparable countries with less production sites. 
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Figure 6. Number of production sites and length of the road network (small European 
countries). 
Figure 6 shows the expected positive relationship between the length of the road network 
and the number of production sites. It shows further that Switzerland has a large number of 
production sites relative to the length of their road network. This is especially remarkable 
in direct comparison to the topographically similar Austria.  
 A further important parameter in a characterization of the supply-side market structure 
is the degree of the vertical integration of firms operating in the market for road surfacing. 
Generally three alternative states can be distinguished. A company can either specialize in 
asphalt mix production or specialize in road surfacing. The third type consists of compa-
nies who are active in both areas. The dataset allows an analysis of the degrees of vertical 
integration across several countries in Europe. The data shows that the number of compa-
nies operating exclusively in asphalt mix production show huge variations across countries. 
There are European countries where almost no independent asphalt mix manufacturers 
exist, whereas in other countries they seem to play a major role. In Switzerland, the num-
ber of firms being active only in the asphalt mix production is relatively high and it has 
increased even more during the last couple of years. One of the main reasons why this ob-
servation might at least partly mask the truth lies again in the holding structure of the Swiss 
road surfacing market. It is unclear whether the data set possibly identifies asphalt mix 
manufacturers as independent, although they are as a matter of fact part of the holding 
structure identified above.   
 The relative number of companies being active exclusively in the asphalt mix produc-
tion should to a certain degree correspond to the relative number of companies active only 
in road surfacing. The analysis of the data shows that this is the case for Switzerland. A 
relatively high number of companies specialized in asphalt mix production is accompanied 
by a relatively high number of companies operating only in road surfacing. This trend is 
also observable in other European countries.   
 In addition to an analysis of the number of firms active in either the production of as-
phalt mix or road surfacing, the complementary data for vertically-integrated companies 
needs to be assessed. The data shows that the number of companies in Switzerland offering 
both asphalt mix production and road surfacing is relatively high compared to other Euro-
pean countries and has steadily increased since 2001.  
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 Taking into account all data on the vertical structure of the road surfacing industry, it is 
possible to calculate an indicator which measures the degree of vertical integration. The 
respective results are displayed in Figure 7.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 7. Degree of vertical integration in the road surfacing industry (2001-2005). 
The degree of vertical integration displayed in Figure 7 is calculated as 100-((P/N)*100) 
where P is the number of firms producing only asphalt mix and N is the total number of 
companies. This means that a country without any explicit independent asphalt mix manu-
facturers, for example, has a degree of vertical integration of 100%. Switzerland with ap-
prox. 55% shows a relatively low degree of vertical integration in comparison to other Eu-
ropean countries. However, it needs to be reminded that the value of this data remains un-
clear as it is not known whether or to what extent the existing holding structure is reflected.    
2. International trade 
The previous section compared the Swiss domestic market for road surfacing with other 
domestic European markets. On this high level of aggregation it is unlikely that the cartel 
agreement described in section III.B. – mainly concerning only a few cantons – led to no-
ticeable effects on market structure parameters. However, especially the fact that the EDA 
was directly aimed at preventing imports of cheaper asphalt mix from Germany to Switzer-
land makes it straightforward to analyze the international trade of asphalt mix between 
Germany and Switzerland before, during and after the termination of the cartel agreement. 
From an economic theory perspective, an increase in the import of cheaper asphalt mix 
from Germany to Switzerland can be expected subsequent to the prohibition of the EDA. 
Ideally, trade takes place until a uniform market price has been reached. However, the lim-
ited transportation possibilities of the asphalt mix and the varying demand locations (i.e. 
construction sites) make German (and Austrian) asphalt mixes imperfect substitutes. Thus, 
in practice a certain price difference between Germany and Switzerland can still be ex-
pected. Furthermore, the holding structure – which was not affected by the termination of 
the cartel – can act as another explanation why prices in Switzerland remain higher in the 
post-cartel phase.   
 Given these straightforward hypotheses, the empirical approach basically needs to study 
the export time series for asphalt mix from Germany to Switzerland. In principle, two dif-
ferent sources of foreign trade data for Germany are available. On the one hand, the Fed-
eral Statistical Office in Wiesbaden collects relevant data for entire Germany. On the other 
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hand, every German Federal State (called ‘Bundesländer’) also collects respective export 
statistics. In the following, the data of the Statistical Office of the Federal State of Baden-
Württemberg is used basically because international trade of asphalt mix with other Fed-
eral States in Southern Germany (most notably Bavaria) is factually impossible given the 
geographical position in combination with the explained specifics of asphalt mix with re-
spect to transportation.53 Therefore, Figure 8 shows the export of asphalt mix from Baden-
Württemberg to Switzerland from 1983 to 2005 in volume and value numbers as well as 
the average price which can easily be derived from these numbers.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 8. Export data and average price per ton of Hot Mix Asphalt from Germany (Ba-
den-Württemberg) to Switzerland (1983-2005). 
Figure 8 shows a very low absolute export level for asphalt mix, never exceeding 8,000 
tons per year and with an average export level significantly below this value. Compared to 
the level of the domestic production in Switzerland of around 4.7 million tons, the imports 
from Germany therefore contributed only less than 0.2% to the Swiss demand of asphalt 
mix. Further interpreting Figure 8, two significant increases in export activity are notice-
                                                 
53 It should be remarked here that the analysis in the report was undertaken for both data sources. Surpris-
ingly, both datasets differ substantially with respect to the size of international trade, however, not so much 
with respect to the pattern of international trade. 
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able – one in the early nineties and one in 2005. In both cases, it is likely that construction 
sites near the German border explain this increased export activity. A comparison of the 
export time series in volume and value (in Euro) is insofar noticeable as a strong correla-
tion exists between both time series since the early 1990 (which was not observable be-
fore). However, much more important, Figure 8 shows a noticeable decrease of export ac-
tivity (in volume and value) during the period from 1996 to 2000 in which the cartel 
agreement was implemented. After the detection and termination of the cartel an increase 
in the export activity of asphalt mix can be observed. Although there is no way with the 
data at hand to further substantiate a possible causality between the cartel agreement and 
the decrease during or the increase in export activity after the cartel agreement, Figure 8 at 
least indicates that this might have played a role.  
 Given that trans-border operations only mark a little share of a company’s business, it is 
not surprising that export shares show a high volatility, since exports may depend on single 
projects. As Figure 8 additionally shows, the average price per ton of export of Hot Mix 
Asphalt to Switzerland shows a strongly decreasing trend until the beginning of the nine-
ties. The period between the early nineties and the termination of the cartel in 2001 is char-
acterized by considerable price increase. The years after the cartel termination again show 
a significant decrease of the average price per ton for exports to Switzerland. Here, basi-
cally the same conclusion can be given than above with respect to the volume/value fig-
ures. Again, the time series in Figure 8 does not exclude the presumption that the termina-
tion of the cartel led to increased competition and therefore to a reduction in the average 
export price. However, as before, there is no way to further substantiate a possible causal-
ity with the data available.    
B. Demand-side analysis 
The natural complement to the analysis of the supply-side in the last section is the analysis 
of the demand-side of the market for road surfacing in Switzerland. In this respect, the case 
description in section III.B. above already indicated that the direct customers of asphalt 
mix manufacturers are the road construction companies using it as key input. The services 
of the road construction companies are in turn demanded to a great extent54 by the official 
contracting authorities who are responsible for road maintenance and road construction in 
Switzerland. As a consequence, the demand side of the market for road surfacing is basi-
cally defined by the construction expenses of the Swiss contracting authorities. The alloca-
tion of this demand to the various road construction companies is usually carried out in the 
form of tenders. 
 A first look at aggregated demand data for Switzerland collected by the Federal Statisti-
cal Office (BFS) shows that the expenses for the construction of new roads by contracting 
authorities sum up to more than CHF 4 billion per year. Between 1997 and 2000 a slight 
demand increase can be observed, however, the overall demand is relatively stable over 
time. More insightful than analyzing aggregated demand data on state level is an analysis 
of the respective data for the seven main regions of Switzerland (Eastern Switzerland, Zu-
rich, Central Switzerland, Northwestern Switzerland, Espace Midland, Lake Geneva region 
and Ticino) which is also collected by the BFS. Figure 9 displays the expenses for road 
construction of the contracting authorities in the Swiss main regions from 1998 to 2005 at 
current prices. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
54 The private demand for road surfacing is so low that it can be disregarded in the following. 
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Figure 9. Expenses for road construction of contracting authorities in the Swiss main re-
gions (1998-2005). 
As shown in Figure 9, the road construction expenses of contracting authorities for road 
construction in the Swiss main regions are only partly discontinuous. Besides the tempo-
rarily high expenses in the Espace Midland region, the expenses in the Zurich region rose 
over several years. However, most other regions do not show drastic year-on-year changes 
in their expenses for road construction.  
 Given the fact that the cartel agreement focused on particularly three cantons, it is sen-
sible to further reduce the level of aggregation and to analyze the demand development for 
the three single cantons primarily affected. Figure 10 therefore shows the respective in-
vestments of the contracting authorities in road construction in the cantons of Schaff-
hausen, Thurgau and Zurich.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 10. Investments of contracting authorities in road construction (1998-2006) for 
selected cantons. 
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As Figure 10 shows, the cantons affected by the agreement are characterized by very dif-
ferent investment levels for road construction (mainly caused by their different canton and 
therefore road network sizes). In the canton of Zurich the construction expenses increased 
over a couple of years, however, in 2006 they were reduced nearly by half. Also in the can-
ton of Schaffhausen an increase of investments is observable in 2006.  
 In addition to the isolated presentation of the demand data of the respective main re-
gions or cantons, a comparative analysis of the development of demand and prices over 
time is of key interest from the economic point of view. In an ideal market it can be ex-
pected that an increase in price leads to a reduction in demand and vice versa. Therefore, 
any price cut due to the termination of the cartel agreement would then have to lead to a 
corresponding increase in demand. The size of the increase would be dependent on the 
prevalent demand elasticity. In order to investigate, whether this essential economic me-
chanism can be found in the data at hand, the following figures compare the respective 
time series of the public expenses for road construction (demand) and the building price 
index55 (price) for selected main regions from 1998 to 2006. 
 As shown in Figure 11, the graphs for the main regions Zurich, Ticino and Central 
Switzerland show no uniform pattern. In the main region of Zurich a reduction in the price 
index is accompanied by an increase of the expenses for construction. In this respect, the 
data confirms the theoretical argument derived above. However, focusing on other regions 
leads to immediate disillusion. For example, in Ticino, constant increases in the price index 
are accompanied by constant increases in the expenses for road construction. However, it 
needs to be reminded that another type of road surfacing cartel was active in Ticino at the 
time and the data might simply reflect the existence of this cartel (see section III.B. above). 
Equally noticeable are the time series for the Central Switzerland region. Both time series 
seem to be highly correlated and show neither a significant change in expenses nor the 
price index.      
 Overall, demand-side analysis does not seem to be very helpful for an analysis of the 
possible effects of the cartel in the market for road surfacing. Although the region of Zu-
rich (which was affected by the cartel agreement) shows a significant switch after the ter-
mination of the cartel, it must be doubted that the cartel had a significant influence on this 
development. Unlike most consumer markets, the demand for publicly funded projects 
such as road construction might be highly price-inelastic in the short and medium term due 
to inertia and other constraints within the contracting authorities. These authorities typi-
cally plan with a fixed budget several years in advance and savings from lower expendi-
tures in single projects cannot be immediately shifted into additional construction projects. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
55 A more specific explanation and analysis of various building price indices follows in section IV.C. 
 24
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 11. Public expenditures and the price index for road construction.  
C. Price analysis 
Following the analysis of the supply- and demand-side of the market for road surfacing in 
Switzerland, the investigation is completed with an analysis of the price developments be-
fore, during and after the cartel agreement. Generally and also referring to the existing lit-
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erature sketched in section II.C. above, noticeable price reductions would be expected after 
the termination of the cartel. The following analyses have the aim of investigating this hy-
pothesis. Unfortunately, data is not available on a regional level but again only for the 
main regions of Switzerland. This is problematic for the desired identification of cartel 
effects because Schaffhausen and Thurgau are only two cantons within in the significantly 
larger main region of Eastern Switzerland. The main region of Zurich thus seems to be the 
preferred object of analysis; however, the problem that arises here is that large parts of the 
region are too far away from the Germany to be considered as potential distribution area 
for these asphalt mix manufacturers.   
 Despite these analytical drawbacks, a general analysis of the price developments for the 
construction of new roads is possible via the so-called building price index which is calcu-
lated by the BFS.56 The building price index is an indicator which reflects the development 
of the effective market prices of domestic companies operating in the construction indus-
try. The index therefore reflects both the cyclical movements of supply and demand and 
possible productivity gains. The index is surveyed semi-annually and provides result for 
the construction industry as a whole, but also for three subtypes of superstructure activities 
(new construction of office buildings, new construction of dwellings, new construction of 
wooden dwellings and renovation of dwellings) and two subtypes of substructure activities 
(new construction of road parts and new construction of underpasses). The indices are cal-
culated for the seven main regions of Switzerland. The prices which form the basis of the 
index are taken from contracts effectively concluded from January to April or from July to 
December, respectively. Approximately 3.000 companies provide approx. 30.000 prices 
for the respective survey period. The collected prices are then translated into elementary 
indices, i.e. only the prices of the same company for the same services are compared from 
one survey period to another. In order to calculate the price development of a particular 
construction work, the arithmetic mean of the elementary indices is calculated. Then, the 
indices of the different services are summed up in order to generate the total index for all 
types of construction work in the various main regions. Figure 12 shows the general build-
ing price index for various object types for Switzerland from 1998 to 2007.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 12. Building price index for various object types for Switzerland (1998-2007). 
As shown in Figure 12, the general building price index increased from 1998 to 2001 and 
experienced a drop from 2001 to 2003. Since then, the index again shows a continuously 
                                                 
56 See Steffen & Guillod (2004). 
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increasing pattern across all object types. The price increases in new road construction 
have been less significant than in case of underground construction, however, they lie 
above the average of all construction works. In principle, Figure 12 would allow the allega-
tion that the termination of the cartel in 2001 led to the significant drop in the price index 
in the following years. However, due to the fact that these reductions in the price index can 
also be observed for other objects types with no connection to the cartelized market, there 
must have been other factors which explain the observed reduction in the price index.  
 As a consequence, for the study of the effects of the cartel on market prices, the exami-
nation of the sub-index ‘construction of new roads’ in selected main region is certainly 
more significant. This sub-index – shown in Figure 13 – is also calculated by the BFS with 
road surfacing work taking a weight of 25% in the sub-index.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 13. Building price index for new road construction in Switzerland and in the Swiss 
main regions. 
According to Figure 13, the already identified decrease in the price index from 2001 to 
2003 is also observable in most of the regions here. However, in the main regions which 
were directly impacted by the cartel (i.e. Zurich and Eastern Switzerland), the downward 
trend seems to be stronger than in other main regions. Furthermore, again the time series 
for Ticino is noticeable as the 2001-2003 downward trend of the price index is not observ-
able there. Again, the most straightforward explanation is simply the existence of another 
type of cartel in the road surfacing market (see section III.B. above).  
 Although Figure 13 already allowed a relatively specific view thanks to the provision of 
a separate sub-index for new road construction, the data made available by the BFS even 
allows a further specification of the analysis as – again on the level of the Swiss main re-
gions – a sub-sub-index ‘road surfacing’ is also available. The respective values are plotted 
in Figure 14 for selected main regions from 1998 to 2007.  
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Figure 14. Building price index for road surfacing in selected Swiss main regions.  
Generally, Figure 14 does not differ substantially from the more aggregate price index 
‘new road construction’ just discussed. Again, the figure shows the decrease in the price 
index starting in 2001. However, the decrease of the index in the main regions Zurich and 
Northwestern Switzerland is much more noticeable than in the more aggregated price indi-
ces. One possible explanation for these significant price reductions in road surfacing can be 
seen in the termination of the cartel, however, a potential causality cannot be investigated 
more closely with the data at hand.57 Furthermore, it can be observed that the price index in 
all main regions except Central Switzerland began to rise again after a period of decreases 
or at least roughly constant devolution.   
V. ESTIMATION OF THE ECONOMIC EFFECTS OF THE DECISION 
As already mentioned above, numerous empirical studies come to the conclusion that the 
prosecution of cartels makes a great contribution to the positive welfare effects of competi-
tion policy as a whole. Even though most of the benefits likely result from the (hardly 
quantifiable) deterrent effect and thus the ex-ante prosecution of cartels, the analysis of the 
factual consumer and ‘deadweight’ losses can provide valuable insights into the effects of 
cartel prosecution. The welfare effect can then be measured as the present value of the wel-
fare loss from an ongoing cartel absent an effective competition policy intervention. 
 The approach of quantifying the mentioned effects, neglecting the ‘deadweight losses’, 
is simple and conservative. Based on the observed (increased) cartel price a so-called ‘but-
for’ price must be determined which would prevail if the companies had refrained from the 
cartel agreement and acted competitively instead. The difference between the actual price 
and the ‘but-for’ price must then be multiplied by the output quantity (for the total time of 
the cartel) in order to deduce an assessment of the cartel effects on consumer welfare.  
 Although this technique to quantify the cartel effects appears to be relatively simple, 
numerous obstacles must be overcome in practice. Sometimes it is difficult to fix a uniform 
market price, to detect the exact duration period of a cartel, to determine the passing on of 
the increased costs downstream or the inclusion of taxes into the analysis. A particular 
challenge is usually the derivation of the ‘but-for’ price, partly because the respective final 
                                                 
57 Another possibility to investigate competition intensity would be to compare the price development in 
Switzerland with the price developments in neighboring countries. Although respective price indices are 
calculated in many countries, they can hardly be compared to Switzerland due to different calculation princi-
ples and concepts.  
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results mostly are very sensitive to small changes of the ‘but-for’ price. For the purpose of 
an estimation of the ‘but-for’ price the literature offers various methods, each of which is 
strongly dependent on the data available. One possibility is the use of market prices, which 
were observed before the formation of the cartel in the relevant market. Otherwise, it may 
be possible to analyze comparable markets to derive ‘but-for’ prices. Furthermore, homo-
geneous and heterogeneous oligopoly models can be used to receive competitive market 
prices by applying simulation tools. Moreover, sometimes it is possible to derive ‘but-for’ 
prices from cost data (supplemented by a reasonable return on investment). 
 In the present case of road surfacing, quantification as described above is not possible or 
reasonable, respectively. This is mainly due to two aspects. First, the regional data neces-
sary for the quantification is not available. Second, the case study shows no clear indica-
tion that the collusion-friendly industry structure has significantly changed in the aftermath 
of the decision. Thus, it is unclear whether the decision has directly caused a significant 
decrease in market prices.  
 While a direct quantification of the effects of the decision is not sensible, it is possible 
to give a rough estimate of the potential benefit of a competition policy intervention. For 
this purpose, it is assumed that the increased cartel price for one ton of asphalt mix (ex 
factory) is CHF 130. It is further known from empirical studies that the average surcharge 
of horizontal cartels amounts to approx. 30%.58 If we accept this average value for a road 
surfacing cartel it follows that the competitive price (the so-called ‘but-for’ price) would be 
CHF 100. Thus, the price difference between the cartel price and the competitive price 
would be CHF 30. 
 In order to roughly quantify the cartel effect, the effective demand at the increased car-
tel price must be determined. In 2005, the total asphalt mix production in Switzerland 
amounted to approx. 4.7 million tons. Since the international trade of asphalt mix is insig-
nificant, we assume in the following that the entire quantity was sold on the domestic mar-
ket. The cartel operated mainly in the cantons of Schaffhausen, Thurgau, and Zurich. Al-
though the individual levels of demand for asphalt mix are unknown, we know that the 
total investment volume in 2005 for Switzerland in the industry of road construction was 
about 4.31 billion CHF. Out of this total investment budget approx. 994 million CHF or 
approx. 23% were allotted to the three cantons. Assuming that the regional allocation of 
the investments is proportional to the quantity of processed asphalt mix, it results in an 
amount of processed asphalt mix of 1,083,944 tons. For an increased cartel price of CHF 
130 the costs for asphalt mix in these three cantons amount to CHF 140,912,761. For the 
competitive price of CHF 100, however, the costs would result in CHF 108,394,432. The 
difference of CHF 32,518,329 thus describes the highest possible contribution of competi-
tion policy which is realized when after the termination of the cartel agreement the market 
price falls to the competition level and the cartel price has been 30% above this price. In 
practice this means that the costs for the customers for road surfacing ideally would de-
crease by approx. CHF 32 million. However, it should be pointed out that this amount 
would be the highest possible (efficient) reallocation from the manufacturers to the cus-
tomers. The so-called deadweight loss, i.e. the decrease in demand due to excessive prices, 
is not yet included in this calculation. Ballpark figures exist also here, settling the dead-
weight loss in the range of 10-30% of the surplus gains.59 However, since in this case the 
demand is expected to be relatively inelastic, the deadweight loss can be expected to be 
clearly below this range.   
 As already mentioned before, it is disputable for several reasons that the decision of the 
COMCO had significantly decreased the price level in the road surfacing market or even 
beat it down to the competitive level. Especially due to the identified holding structure it is 
likely that the main direct economic effect of the decision must be seen in the regained 
                                                 
58 See Connor & Lande (2006). 
59 See Connor & Helmers (2006). 
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possibilities of the two independent road construction firms to purchase asphalt mix at 
lower prices from Germany leading to more competitive tender processes insofar as these 
firms are probably able to underprice the vertically integrated Swiss firms. This results in 
cost reductions for contracting authorities and, as a consequence, a reduction in the tax 
burden for the citizens. However, taking into account the limited capacities of both inde-
pendent companies, it is unrealistic to assume that it is possible for them to participate in 
all tenders and therewith to promote competition substantially in the relevant cantons or 
even in entire Switzerland.  
VI. CONCLUSION 
There is no significant doubt among economists that competition policy has established 
itself in most industrialized countries as an integral part of public policy that contributes 
substantially to the improvement of the wealth of nations. However, the follow-up question 
of how substantial these benefits of competition policy have been has not yet attracted 
huge research input by economists. This ‘state of the art’ is unfortunate as, for instance, 
competition authorities have to justify their budgets (or requests for budget increases) and 
might find it helpful to show the significance of their work. Furthermore, economists also 
benefit from showing to what extent society benefits from their public policy recommenda-
tions.  
 Against this background, the paper aimed at assessing the question whether competition 
policy matters by analyzing the impact of the detection of a hard-core cartel in the Swiss 
market for road surfacing on post-cartel competition. In addition to an investigation of 
supply-side factors, demand-side factors, and market prices, the paper also derived esti-
mates of the economic effects of the decision. 
 Overall, the policy implications from this case study can be inferred with regard to both 
the specific case at hand and cartel policy in general. With respect to the specific case, it 
was found that after the detection and prosecution of the cartel agreement, a decrease in the 
price indices for road construction and road surfacing were observed. However, the indus-
try structure existing at the time of the cartel agreement - where road construction compa-
nies were jointly involved in mixing plants via holding companies - has certainly facili-
tated and sustained cartelization and there is no evidence of change in the past years since 
the decision. From this perspective it appears unrealistic that the decision of the COMCO 
alone has had substantial influence on the post-cartel market prices or important parame-
ters of market structure. As already discussed in the last section, the presumably most im-
portant direct effect should be seen in the retrieval or at least in the improvement of the 
competitive position of the independent road construction firms. This intervention was 
successful insofar as both firms are still active in the market. 
 A possible and economically valuable effect of the case decision might be that firms 
generally or at least in the road surfacing industry become more cautious with respect to 
cartel formation. If the companies decide to reduce the actual cartel price by a small 
amount in order to reduce the probability of detection for the respective cartel agreement, 
the savings on the consumer side could already be substantial. In the hypothetical example 
above, a decrease of the price per ton by 5 Francs (from CHF 130 to CHF 125) would, for 
example, lead to annual savings in the amount of approx. CHF 5.419.722. It should be re-
minded that this value applies only to the three cantons directly affected by the cartel 
agreement and only refers to a relatively small market, namely that for road surfacing.    
 With respect to the implications for general cartel policy, one improvement possibility 
would be to carry out screenings to identify potentially collusion-friendly industries by 
using a set of collusion factors. Subsequently, these suspicious industries should then be 
investigated more closely focusing on market structure, market behavior and market re-
sults, possibly in the form of ‘inquiries’ conducted by the UK Competition Commission. 
Such an approach would not only raise the probability to detect cartels directly but it would 
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also create a signal for the firms in the respective industries that they are on a watch. Ide-
ally, one of the respective companies becomes nervous enough to decide to apply for leni-
ency. A valuable side effect of such screenings and industry studies lies in the better 
knowledge of the respective markets and thus in the generation of knowledge which sub-
sequently influences the quality and the pace of decision making within the competition 
authority.  
 However, screening should not be limited to the pre-evidence stage. Especially after the 
discovery of collusive behavior in a particular market, a constant monitoring is advisable, 
in particular if collusion-friendly industry structures remain effective. Imposing a closer 
monitoring of former cartel members with respect to their pricing strategies, cost struc-
tures, and cooperation in joint projects may be a proper instrument for an competition au-
thority to prevent a reemergence of collusion even in tacit way. Furthermore, it follows 
immediately that any further concentration in these markets should be investigated very 
closely by the competition authority. Any merger either on the level of asphalt mixing or 
road construction should be cleared conditional on breaking up horizontal or vertical ties 
that might reinforce coordinated behavior. Overall, providing a large set of instruments and 
a large scope of discretion to the competition authority helps to create uncertainty that is 
detrimental to any kind of collusive activity among firms.   
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